再次呼吁在51里开设一精神心理健康板块，对那些经常回帖文不对题，南辕北辙，内容莫名其妙的网友进行心理辅导。这于公于私都是件积德的好事，也避免给51带来负面影响:D
如果有人认为是真心送1000万女人。。。那我觉得到是脑子有毛病了。如果尼克松真的傻到这个地步，连村长都没资格当。
毛主席可能在暗示中国人是杀不完的。。。当时美国军事比中国强大很多！中国的砝码不够。现在基本是不需要放狠话了。
克 飞 发表于 2013-7-13 09:46 http://bbs.51.ca/images/common/back.gif
我知道他不是说真的，就是说着玩。但我以为他脑子坏了，你想幽默想开玩笑可以啊，但反反复复就这一个低级笑话？人家都不想接你的茬，你还说，真是庸俗的可以啊。
我知道他不是说真的，就是说着玩。但我以为他脑子坏了，你想幽默想开玩笑可以啊，但反反复复就这一个低级笑话？人家都不想接你的茬，你还说，真是庸俗的可以啊。
了然于胸 发表于 2013-7-13 19:21 http://bbs.51.ca/images/common/back.gif
时代不同，文化背景不同。。。毛泽东暗示中国人是杀不完的。。。尼克松听了是不舒服的。
本帖最后由 参靠言论 于 2013-7-13 22:59 编辑
基辛格博士是基督徒吧，在场面上不接茬老毛这样的话是正常的
大家都知道越南有过剩的女人。。。。为什么啊？越南战争打的呀，男的死得太多了。
毛粉们被毛泽东与基辛格哪段关于送美国1000万中国女人的对话惊呆了胡硕士 发表于 2013-7-12 22:24 http://bbs.51.ca/images/common/back.gif
送美国1000万女人中，你家占了几分之一呀？ 难怪网友们揭发你家的户口本非常重；
不过你为啥沦落到加拿大了呢？ 难道你还有美国籍？
这叫什麽东西？这就叫伟大领袖，伟大导师，伟大舵手？连基辛格都都不好意思接茬儿。
请无聊妹妹评论一下。。。。。。
酒中仙 发表于 2013-7-13 01:00 http://bbs.51.ca/images/common/back.gif
你相信两国高级领导人们，会在一起正儿八经讨论，在两国都非法的人口交易吗？
毛泽东一生扑克脸，从来皮笑肉不笑，不是个哈哈大笑的人，这解密不是真的
再次呼吁在51里开设一精神心理健康板块，对那些经常回帖文不对题，南辕北辙，内容莫名其妙的网友进行心理辅导。这于公于私都是件积德的好事，也避免给51带来负面影响
胡硕士 发表于 2013-7-13 18:21 http://bbs.51.ca/images/common/back.gif
你肯定是版主了，呵呵呵。。。
你相信两国高级领导人们，会在一起正儿八经讨论，在两国都非法的人口交易吗？
wuliaomm 发表于 2013-7-14 01:48 http://bbs.51.ca/images/common/back.gif
老尼和老毛和老周--------说的是群口相声
你相信两国高级领导人们，会在一起正儿八经讨论，在两国都非法的人口交易吗？
wuliaomm 发表于 2013-7-14 01:48 http://bbs.51.ca/images/common/back.gif
毛泽东天天读资治通鉴，他不可能不知道“君无戏言”的道理。
即便是开玩笑，这种低级的，侮辱每一个中国人母亲的玩笑也只有他这样张狂无耻的人才能说得出口。而且是在对方毫无兴趣的情况下，一再回到这种话题，津津乐道，可见其内心的污浊。这和他年轻的时候，老婆孩子在为他坐监狱，他自己已经另有新欢的事迹同出一辙。
小祖同志怎麽哑巴了？
本帖最后由 祖宗 于 2013-7-15 18:46 编辑
其一，如果是正式的官方记录，不可能只在美国一家有，中方这里也应该有。中方这里从来没有登出相应的记录，本人不敢妄言。
其二，无聊话题，断章取义，而且翻译很蹩脚。把“That way you can lessen our burdens”翻译成“这样你们就知道我们的负担了”，也就是把“lessen”把看成“lesson”，正所谓“饥不择食”。“lessen”的意思是“减少”，绝对不含“知道”之意。
其三，毛的风格是嘻笑怒骂皆成文章，在重大礼宾场合说一些俏皮话，符合他的性格。
其四、所谓“出口女人”真正的含义是什么？毛在后文讲得清楚，是给你们美国制造灾难去了，“像洪水一样淹没你的国家，同时伤害你们的利益”！这正是毛的风格，嘻笑之间话中带刀。殊不知，在八亿神州八亿兵的年代，真要是出口美国一千万妇女意味着什么？意味着一千万女民兵！不把你美帝国主义灭了才叫怪！
其五、毛在后文正式说“今天我说了一些无聊的话，为此，我必须向中国的妇女们致歉。”这句话没有被转者登出，可见其断章取义的不良动机。
为了让大家更加看清楚反毛反华小丑嘴脸，本人现将会谈记录所谓的“原文”登出：
12. Memorandum of Conversation11. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 98, Country Files, Far East, HAK China Trip, Memcons & Reports (originals), February 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in Mao's residence at Chungnahai. All brackets are in the original. A February 17 memorandum from Kissinger, sent telegraphically through Scowcroft, to Nixon recounted that the meeting with Mao “was extremely frank and cordial, but the substance is of such sensitivity that I should report it to you in person.” (Ibid., HAK Trip Files, Box 29, Bangkok, Vientiane, Hanoi, Hong Kong, Peking, Tokyo Trip, Itinerary Como Info, Memos to Pres., February 7–20, 1973)
Beijing, February 17–18, 1973, 11:30 p.m.–1:20 a.m.
PARTICIPANTS
Mao Tsetung, Chairman, Politburo, Chinese Communist Party
Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council
Wang Hai-jung, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs
Tang Wen-sheng, Interpreter
Shen Jo-yun, Interpreter
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
(At 11:00 p.m. February 17, 1973 at a meeting in a villa near the Guest House where Dr. Kissinger and his party were staying, Prime Minister Chou En-lai informed Dr. Kissinger that he and Winston Lord were invited to meet with Chairman Mao Tsetung at 11:30 p.m. that evening. He told Dr. Kissinger that he would come to the Guest House shortly to escort him to the Chairman's residence.
Dr. Kissinger and his delegation members at the meeting went back to the Guest House. Prime Minister Chou En-lai came to the Guest House at 11:20 p.m. and rode with Dr. Kissinger to Chungnahai. Mr. Chu, Deputy Director of Protocol, accompanied Mr. Lord. Prime Minister Chou En-lai escorted Dr. Kissinger into the outer room of the Guest House and then through another room to Chairman Mao's sitting room.
The Chairman was helped up from his chair by his young female attendant and came forward to greet Dr. Kissinger. Photographers took pictures. He welcomed Dr. Kissinger and Dr. Kissinger pointed out that it was almostly exactly a year ago that he had first met the Chairman. The Chairman then greeted Mr. Lord and commented that he was so young, younger than the interpreters. Mr. Lord replied that he was in any event older than the interpreters. The Chairman then motioned to the large easy chairs and the parties sat down. The photographers continued to take pictures.)
Chairman Mao (As he headed toward his chair): I don't look bad, but God has sent me an invitation.
(To Mr. Lord) You are a young man.
Mr. Lord: I am getting older.
Chairman Mao: I am the oldest among those seated here.
Prime Minister Chou: I am the second oldest.
Chairman Mao: There was someone in the British Army who was opposed to the independence of your country. Field Marshal Montgomery was one of those to oppose your policy.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
Chairman Mao: He opposed the Dulles policy.22. This memorandum of conversation is also printed in The Kissinger Transcripts, edited by William Burr (pp. 86–101). In explaining Mao's comment about Field Marshal Montgomery, Burr notes that the British war hero visited China in 1960 and 1961. On that trip he met with Mao and Zhou and condemned the American policy associated with former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles of opposing recognition of Communist China. He probably doesn't oppose you anymore. At that time, you also opposed us. We also opposed you. So we are two enemies (Laughter).
Dr. Kissinger: Two former enemies.
Chairman Mao: Now we call the relationship between ourselves a friendship.
Dr. Kissinger: That's our sentiment.
Chairman Mao: That's what I am saying.
Dr. Kissinger: I have told the Prime Minister that we speak to no other country as frankly and as openly as we do to you.
Chairman Mao (To the photographers): That's all for you.
But let us not speak false words or engage in trickery. We don't steal your documents. You can deliberately leave them somewhere and try us out. Nor do we engage in eavesdropping and bugging. There is no use in those small tricks. And some of the big maneuvering, there is no use to them too. I said that to your correspondent, Mr. Edgar Snow.33. The journalist Edgar Snow wrote the book, Red Star Over China, that introduced Mao to an American audience during the 1930s. I said that your CIA is no good for major events.
Dr. Kissinger: That's absolutely true. That's been our experience.
Chairman Mao: Because when you issue an order, for example, when your President issues an order, and you want information on a certain question, then the intelligence reports come as so many snowflakes. We also have our intelligence service and it is the same with them. They do not work well (Prime Minister Chou laughs). For instance, they didn't know about Lin Piao.44. Lin Biao, PRC Minister of Defense from 1959 to September 1971, allegedly plotted to assassinate Mao. (Prime Minister Chou laughs) Then again they didn't know you wanted to come.
I read two articles in 1969. One of your Directors of your China desk in the State Department wrote an article later published in a Japanese newspaper.
Dr. Kissinger: I don't think I read that.
Prime Minister Chou: I hadn't mentioned it to you before.
Dr. Kissinger: No.
Chairman Mao: Your business was done well. You've been flying everywhere. Are you a swallow or a pigeon? (Laughter) And the Vietnamese issue can be counted as basically settled.
Dr. Kissinger: That is our feeling. We must now have a transitional period toward tranquility.
Chairman Mao: Yes, that's right.
Dr. Kissinger: The basic issues are settled.
Chairman Mao: We also say in the same situation (gesturing with his hand) that's what your President said when he was sitting here, that each side has its own means and acted out of its own necessity. That resulted in the two countries acting hand-in-hand.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, we both face the same danger. We may have to use different methods sometimes but for the same objectives.
Chairman Mao: That would be good. So long as the objectives are the same, we would not harm you nor would you harm us. And we can work together to commonly deal with a bastard. (Laughter)
Actually it would be that sometime we want to criticize you for a while and you want to criticize us for a while. That, your President said, is the ideological influence. You say, away with you Communists. We say, away with you imperialists. Sometimes we say things like that. It would not do not to do that.
Dr. Kissinger: I think both of us must be true to our principles. And in fact it would confuse the situation if we spoke the same language. I have told the Prime Minister that in Europe you, because of your principles, can speak more firmly than we can, strangely enough.
Chairman Mao: As for you, in Europe and Japan, we hope that you will cooperate with each other. As for some things it is alright to quarrel and bicker about, but fundamental cooperation is needed.
Dr. Kissinger: As between you and us, even if we sometimes criticize each other, we will coordinate our actions with you, and we would never participate in a policy to isolate you. As for Japan and Europe, we agree that we should cooperate on all essential matters with them. Europe has very weak leadership right now.
Chairman Mao: They don't unite with each other.
Dr. Kissinger: They don't unite, and they don't take farsighted views. When they are confronted with a danger they hope it will go away without effort.
Prime Minister Chou: I told Dr. Kissinger you should still help Pompidou.55. France held a general election on March 4 and 11. The coalition associated with French President Georges Pompidou maintained a majority in the National Assembly.
Chairman Mao: Yes indeed.
Dr. Kissinger: We are doing our utmost, and we will do more.
Chairman Mao: (Gesturing with his hands) Now Mr. Pompidou is being threatened. It is the Socialist Party and the Communist Party putting their strength against him.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, and they have united.
Chairman Mao: (Pointing at Dr. Kissinger) They are uniting and the Soviet Union wants the Communist Party to get into office. I don't like their Communist party, just like I don't like your Communist party. I like you, but not your Communist party. (Laughter)
In the West you always historically had a policy, for example, in both World Wars you always began by pushing Germany to fight against Russia.
Dr. Kissinger: But it is not our policy to push Russia to fight against China, because the danger to us of a war in China is as great as a war in Europe.
Chairman Mao: (Before Dr. Kissinger's remarks are translated, he makes remarks in Chinese and counts on his fingers. Miss Tang then translates Dr. Kissinger's remarks and after that Chairman Mao's remarks.)
What I wanted to say is whether or not you are now pushing West Germany to make peace with Russia and then push Russia eastward. I suspect the whole of the West has such an idea, that is to push Russia eastward, mainly against us and also Japan. Also probably towards you, in the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean.
Dr. Kissinger: We did not favor this policy. We preferred the German opposition party which did not pursue this policy. (Chairman Mao, smoking a cigar, offers cigars to Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Lord who decline.)
Chairman Mao: Yes, that's our feeling. We are also in favor of the opposition party in Germany.
Dr. Kissinger: They conducted themselves very stupidly.
Chairman Mao: Yes, they were defeated. The whole of Europe is thinking only of peace.
Prime Minister Chou: The illusions of peace created by their leaders.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but we will do our best to strengthen European defenses and keep our armies in Europe.
Chairman Mao: That would be very good.
Dr. Kissinger: We have no plan for any large reduction of our forces in Europe for the next four years (Chairman Mao turns to Prime Minister Chou).
Prime Minister Chou: In talking about reducing your troops, you mean only at the most 10 to 15 percent.
Dr. Kissinger: That is exactly correct.
Chairman Mao: What is the number of American troops in Europe? They are probably mostly rocket units.
Prime Minister Chou: There are between 300–350,000 including the Mediterranean.
Chairman Mao: That probably does not include the Navy.
Dr. Kissinger: It does not include the Navy. There are about 275,000 in Central Europe. That does not include the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.
Chairman Mao: And your troop deployment to Asia and the Pacific Ocean is too scattered. You have them in Korea. I heard the number is about 300,000.
Dr. Kissinger: About 40,000.
Chairman Mao: And from 8 to 9,000 with Chiang Kai-shek.
Prime Minister Chou: In Taiwan.
Chairman Mao: Then it is said that there are two groups in Japan, 40,000 in Okinawa and 20 to 30,000 in Japan proper. I don't know how many there are in the Philippines. Now you have remaining in Vietnam a bit over 10,000.
Dr. Kissinger: But they will all be withdrawn.
Chairman Mao: Yes, and I heard that you have 40,000 in Thailand.
Dr. Kissinger: That is correct. But all the units the Chairman mentioned are mostly air force units and therefore they probably cannot be measured by the number of personnel.
Chairman Mao: You also have ground forces, for instance, in South Korea.
Dr. Kissinger: In South Korea we have ground forces.
Chairman Mao: That was all begun by Truman and Acheson. So this time you held a memorial service for Truman and we didn't go. (Laughter)
Dr. Kissinger: When you have a liaison office in Washington it will be more possible in the future.
Prime Minister Chou: You've held all these memorial services, both for Truman and Johnson (Chairman Mao and Prime Minister Chou laugh).
It seems to me that your voice is hoarse today. You should have a day's rest tomorrow. Why do you want to continue to talk so much?
Dr. Kissinger: Because it is very important that you and we understand what we are going to do and to coordinate our actions, and therefore we always tell the Prime Minister what our plans are in various areas of the world so that you can understand the individual moves when they are made.
Chairman Mao: Yes. When you pass through Japan, you should perhaps talk a bit more with them. You only talked with them for one day and that isn't very good for their face.
Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, we wanted this trip's emphasis to be on the talks in Peking, and I will take a separate trip to Tokyo.
Chairman Mao: Good. And also make clear to them.
You know the Japanese feelings towards the Soviet Union are not so very good.
Dr. Kissinger: They are very ambivalent.
Chairman Mao: (Gesturing with his hand) In a word, during the Second World War, Prime Minister Tanaka told our Premier, what the Soviet Union did was that upon seeing a person about to hang himself, they immediately took the chair from under his feet.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
Chairman Mao: It could be said that they didn't fire a single shot and yet they were able to grab so many places (Prime Minister Chou chuckles). They grabbed the People's Republic of Mongolia. They grabbed half of Sinkiang. It was called a sphere of influence. And Manchukuo, on the northeast, was also called their sphere of influence.
Dr. Kissinger: And they took all the industry out of it.
Chairman Mao: Yes. And they grabbed also the islands of Sakhalin and the Kuriles Island. (Chairman Mao and Prime Minister Chou discuss among themselves.) Sakhalin is the southern part of the Kuriles Island. I will look it up in the dictionary to see what its Chinese translation is.
Dr. Kissinger: The Japanese are tempted by the economic possibilities in Russia.
Chairman Mao: (Nodding yes) They want to grab something there.
Dr. Kissinger: But we will encourage closer ties between Japan and ourselves, and also we welcome their relationship with the People's Republic.
Chairman Mao: We also believe that rather than Japan having closer relations with the Soviet Union, we would rather that they would better their relations with you. That would be better.
Dr. Kissinger: It would be very dangerous if Japan and the Soviet Union formed closer political relations.
Chairman Mao: That doesn't seem likely.
Prime Minister Chou: The prospects are not too good.
Chairman Mao: We can also do some work there.
Dr. Kissinger: The Soviet Union has made overtures but the Japanese have not responded. They have invited Ohira to go to Moscow.
Prime Minister Chou: Yes, this year, the second half.
Dr. Kissinger: This year.
Prime Minister Chou: And it seems on this question that Ohira has a clearer idea of the Soviet Union than others. But there are some not so clear in their understanding as their Foreign Minister.
Dr. Kissinger: That is correct.
Prime Minister Chou: That is also the bureaucracy as you term it.
Dr. Kissinger: We are prepared to exchange information with you on these matters.
Prime Minister Chou: (To Chairman Mao) We have decided besides establishing a liaison office in each capital to maintain the contact between Huang Hua and the White House.
Chairman Mao: (To Prime Minister Chou) Where is the stress?
Prime Minister Chou: The liaison office will handle the general public exchanges. For confidential and urgent matters not covered by the liaison office we will use the channel of Ambassador Huang Hua.
Chairman Mao: Huang Hua has met an ill fate (Prime Minister Chou laughs). He was doing very well in your place and immediately upon his return to Shanghai, he twisted his back.
Dr. Kissinger: We will find a doctor for him when he returns.
Chairman Mao: Yes. (Prime Minister Chou laughs). He seemed more safe in your place. Immediately upon his return to Shanghai he collapsed.
From the atmosphere with which your President received our acrobatic troupe, I thought that the Vietnamese issue was going to be settled.
There were some rumors that said that you were about to collapse (laughter). And the women folk seated here were all dissatisfied with that (laughter, especially pronounced among the women). They said if the Doctor is going to collapse, we would be out of work.
Dr. Kissinger: Not only in China.
Chairman Mao: Yes, and the whole line would collapse like dominos.
Dr. Kissinger: Those were just journalists' speculation.
Chairman Mao: Only speculation?
Dr. Kissinger: Only speculation.
Chairman Mao: No ground whatsoever?
Dr. Kissinger: No ground whatsoever. In fact the opposite was true. We have now been able to place our men into all key positions.
Chairman Mao: (Nodding yes) Your President is now saying that you are proposing something as if you were moving the Great Wall from China to the United States, that is, trade barriers.
Dr. Kissinger: What we want to do is lower barriers.
Chairman Mao: To lower them? Then you were doing that just to frighten people. You are saying that you are going to raise tariffs and non-tariff barriers and maybe you do that to intimidate Europe and Japan.