为了让大家更加看清楚反毛反华小丑嘴脸，本人现将会谈记录所谓的“原文”登出：
12. Memorandum of Conversation11. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 98, Country Files, Far East, HAK China Trip, Memcons & Reports (originals), February 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in Mao's residence at Chungnahai. All brackets are in the original. A February 17 memorandum from Kissinger, sent telegraphically through Scowcroft, to Nixon recounted that the meeting with Mao “was extremely frank and cordial, but the substance is of such sensitivity that I should report it to you in person.” (Ibid., HAK Trip Files, Box 29, Bangkok, Vientiane, Hanoi, Hong Kong, Peking, Tokyo Trip, Itinerary Como Info, Memos to Pres., February 7–20, 1973)
Beijing, February 17–18, 1973, 11:30 p.m.–1:20 a.m.
PARTICIPANTS
Mao Tsetung, Chairman, Politburo, Chinese Communist Party
Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council
Wang Hai-jung, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs
Tang Wen-sheng, Interpreter
Shen Jo-yun, Interpreter
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
(At 11:00 p.m. February 17, 1973 at a meeting in a villa near the Guest House where Dr. Kissinger and his party were staying, Prime Minister Chou En-lai informed Dr. Kissinger that he and Winston Lord were invited to meet with Chairman Mao Tsetung at 11:30 p.m. that evening. He told Dr. Kissinger that he would come to the Guest House shortly to escort him to the Chairman's residence.
Dr. Kissinger and his delegation members at the meeting went back to the Guest House. Prime Minister Chou En-lai came to the Guest House at 11:20 p.m. and rode with Dr. Kissinger to Chungnahai. Mr. Chu, Deputy Director of Protocol, accompanied Mr. Lord. Prime Minister Chou En-lai escorted Dr. Kissinger into the outer room of the Guest House and then through another room to Chairman Mao's sitting room.
The Chairman was helped up from his chair by his young female attendant and came forward to greet Dr. Kissinger. Photographers took pictures. He welcomed Dr. Kissinger and Dr. Kissinger pointed out that it was almostly exactly a year ago that he had first met the Chairman. The Chairman then greeted Mr. Lord and commented that he was so young, younger than the interpreters. Mr. Lord replied that he was in any event older than the interpreters. The Chairman then motioned to the large easy chairs and the parties sat down. The photographers continued to take pictures.)
Chairman Mao (As he headed toward his chair): I don't look bad, but God has sent me an invitation.
(To Mr. Lord) You are a young man.
Mr. Lord: I am getting older.
Chairman Mao: I am the oldest among those seated here.
Prime Minister Chou: I am the second oldest.
Chairman Mao: There was someone in the British Army who was opposed to the independence of your country. Field Marshal Montgomery was one of those to oppose your policy.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
Chairman Mao: He opposed the Dulles policy.22. This memorandum of conversation is also printed in The Kissinger Transcripts, edited by William Burr (pp. 86–101). In explaining Mao's comment about Field Marshal Montgomery, Burr notes that the British war hero visited China in 1960 and 1961. On that trip he met with Mao and Zhou and condemned the American policy associated with former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles of opposing recognition of Communist China. He probably doesn't oppose you anymore. At that time, you also opposed us. We also opposed you. So we are two enemies (Laughter).
Dr. Kissinger: Two former enemies.
Chairman Mao: Now we call the relationship between ourselves a friendship.
Dr. Kissinger: That's our sentiment.
Chairman Mao: That's what I am saying.
Dr. Kissinger: I have told the Prime Minister that we speak to no other country as frankly and as openly as we do to you.
Chairman Mao (To the photographers): That's all for you.
[The photographers leave.]
But let us not speak false words or engage in trickery. We don't steal your documents. You can deliberately leave them somewhere and try us out. Nor do we engage in eavesdropping and bugging. There is no use in those small tricks. And some of the big maneuvering, there is no use to them too. I said that to your correspondent, Mr. Edgar Snow.33. The journalist Edgar Snow wrote the book, Red Star Over China, that introduced Mao to an American audience during the 1930s. I said that your CIA is no good for major events.
Dr. Kissinger: That's absolutely true. That's been our experience.
Chairman Mao: Because when you issue an order, for example, when your President issues an order, and you want information on a certain question, then the intelligence reports come as so many snowflakes. We also have our intelligence service and it is the same with them. They do not work well (Prime Minister Chou laughs). For instance, they didn't know about Lin Piao.44. Lin Biao, PRC Minister of Defense from 1959 to September 1971, allegedly plotted to assassinate Mao. (Prime Minister Chou laughs) Then again they didn't know you wanted to come.
I read two articles in 1969. One of your Directors of your China desk in the State Department wrote an article later published in a Japanese newspaper.
Dr. Kissinger: I don't think I read that.
Prime Minister Chou: I hadn't mentioned it to you before.
Dr. Kissinger: No.
Chairman Mao: Your business was done well. You've been flying everywhere. Are you a swallow or a pigeon? (Laughter) And the Vietnamese issue can be counted as basically settled.
Dr. Kissinger: That is our feeling. We must now have a transitional period toward tranquility.
Chairman Mao: Yes, that's right.
Dr. Kissinger: The basic issues are settled.
Chairman Mao: We also say in the same situation (gesturing with his hand) that's what your President said when he was sitting here, that each side has its own means and acted out of its own necessity. That resulted in the two countries acting hand-in-hand.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, we both face the same danger. We may have to use different methods sometimes but for the same objectives.
Chairman Mao: That would be good. So long as the objectives are the same, we would not harm you nor would you harm us. And we can work together to commonly deal with a bastard. (Laughter)
Actually it would be that sometime we want to criticize you for a while and you want to criticize us for a while. That, your President said, is the ideological influence. You say, away with you Communists. We say, away with you imperialists. Sometimes we say things like that. It would not do not to do that.
Dr. Kissinger: I think both of us must be true to our principles. And in fact it would confuse the situation if we spoke the same language. I have told the Prime Minister that in Europe you, because of your principles, can speak more firmly than we can, strangely enough.
Chairman Mao: As for you, in Europe and Japan, we hope that you will cooperate with each other. As for some things it is alright to quarrel and bicker about, but fundamental cooperation is needed.
Dr. Kissinger: As between you and us, even if we sometimes criticize each other, we will coordinate our actions with you, and we would never participate in a policy to isolate you. As for Japan and Europe, we agree that we should cooperate on all essential matters with them. Europe has very weak leadership right now.
Chairman Mao: They don't unite with each other.
Dr. Kissinger: They don't unite, and they don't take farsighted views. When they are confronted with a danger they hope it will go away without effort.
Prime Minister Chou: I told Dr. Kissinger you [the U.S.] should still help Pompidou.55. France held a general election on March 4 and 11. The coalition associated with French President Georges Pompidou maintained a majority in the National Assembly.
Chairman Mao: Yes indeed.
Dr. Kissinger: We are doing our utmost, and we will do more.
Chairman Mao: (Gesturing with his hands) Now Mr. Pompidou is being threatened. It is the Socialist Party and the Communist Party putting their strength against him.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, and they have united.
Chairman Mao: (Pointing at Dr. Kissinger) They are uniting and the Soviet Union wants the Communist Party to get into office. I don't like their Communist party, just like I don't like your Communist party. I like you, but not your Communist party. (Laughter)
In the West you always historically had a policy, for example, in both World Wars you always began by pushing Germany to fight against Russia.
Dr. Kissinger: But it is not our policy to push Russia to fight against China, because the danger to us of a war in China is as great as a war in Europe.
Chairman Mao: (Before Dr. Kissinger's remarks are translated, he makes remarks in Chinese and counts on his fingers. Miss Tang then translates Dr. Kissinger's remarks and after that Chairman Mao's remarks.)
What I wanted to say is whether or not you are now pushing West Germany to make peace with Russia and then push Russia eastward. I suspect the whole of the West has such an idea, that is to push Russia eastward, mainly against us and also Japan. Also probably towards you, in the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean.
Dr. Kissinger: We did not favor this policy. We preferred the German opposition party which did not pursue this policy. (Chairman Mao, smoking a cigar, offers cigars to Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Lord who decline.)
Chairman Mao: Yes, that's our feeling. We are also in favor of the opposition party in Germany.
Dr. Kissinger: They conducted themselves very stupidly.
Chairman Mao: Yes, they were defeated. The whole of Europe is thinking only of peace.
Prime Minister Chou: The illusions of peace created by their leaders.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but we will do our best to strengthen European defenses and keep our armies in Europe.
Chairman Mao: That would be very good. |
楼主: 胡硕士
狗仔卡
楼主
显身卡
发表于 2013-7-13 18:21:48
发表于 2013-7-14 11:14:24
