这是到目前为止我看到的关于失联飞机 MH370 最靠谱的推论 - 无忧论坛

There has been a lot of speculation about Malaysia Airlines Flight 370. Terrorism, hijacking, meteors. I cannot believe the analysis on CNN; it’s almost disturbing. I tend to look for a simpler explanation, and I find it with the 13,000-foot runway at Pulau Langkawi.

We know the story of MH370: A loaded Boeing 777 departs at midnight from Kuala Lampur, headed to Beijing. A hot night. A heavy aircraft. About an hour out, across the gulf toward Vietnam, the plane goes dark, meaning the transponder and secondary radar tracking go off. Two days later we hear reports that Malaysian military radar (which is a primary radar, meaning the plane is tracked by reflection rather than by transponder interrogation response) has tracked the plane on a southwesterly course back across the Malay Peninsula into the Strait of Malacca.

The left turn is the key here. Zaharie Ahmad Shah1 was a very experienced senior captain with 18,000 hours of flight time. We old pilots were drilled to know what is the closest airport of safe harbor while in cruise. Airports behind us, airports abeam us, and airports ahead of us. They’re always in our head. Always. If something happens, you don’t want to be thinking about what are you going to do–you already know what you are going to do. When I saw that left turn with a direct heading, I instinctively knew he was heading for an airport. He was taking a direct route to Palau Langkawi, a 13,000-foot airstrip with an approach over water and no obstacles. The captain did not turn back to Kuala Lampur because he knew he had 8,000-foot ridges to cross. He knew the terrain was friendlier toward Langkawi, which also was closer.

Take a look at this airport on Google Earth. The pilot did all the right things. He was confronted by some major event onboard that made him make an immediate turn to the closest, safest airport.

When I heard this I immediately brought up Google Earth and searched for airports in proximity to the track toward the southwest.

For me, the loss of transponders and communications makes perfect sense in a fire. And there most likely was an electrical fire. In the case of a fire, the first response is to pull the main busses and restore circuits one by one until you have isolated the bad one. If they pulled the busses, the plane would go silent. It probably was a serious event and the flight crew was occupied with controlling the plane and trying to fight the fire. Aviate, navigate, and lastly, communicate is the mantra in such situations.

There are two types of fires. An electrical fire might not be as fast and furious, and there may or may not be incapacitating smoke. However there is the possibility, given the timeline, that there was an overheat on one of the front landing gear tires, it blew on takeoff and started slowly burning. Yes, this happens with underinflated tires. Remember: Heavy plane, hot night, sea level, long-run takeoff. There was a well known accident in Nigeria of a DC8 that had a landing gear fire on takeoff. Once going, a tire fire would produce horrific, incapacitating smoke. Yes, pilots have access to oxygen masks, but this is a no-no with fire. Most have access to a smoke hood with a filter, but this will last only a few minutes depending on the smoke level. (I used to carry one in my flight bag, and I still carry one in my briefcase when I fly.)

What I think happened is the flight crew was overcome by smoke and the plane continued on the heading, probably on George (autopilot), until it ran out of fuel or the fire destroyed the control surfaces and it crashed. You will find it along that route–looking elsewhere is pointless.

Ongoing speculation of a hijacking and/or murder-suicide and that there was a flight engineer on board does not sway me in favor of foul play until I am presented with evidence of foul play.

We know there was a last voice transmission that, from a pilot’s point of view, was entirely normal. “Good night” is customary on a hand-off to a new air traffic control. The “good night” also strongly indicates to me that all was OK on the flight deck. Remember, there are many ways a pilot can communicate distress. A hijack code or even transponder code off by one digit would alert ATC that something was wrong. Every good pilot knows keying an SOS over the mike always is an option. Even three short clicks would raise an alert. So I conclude that at the point of voice transmission all was perceived as well on the flight deck by the pilots.

But things could have been in the process of going wrong, unknown to the pilots.

Evidently the ACARS went inoperative some time before. Disabling the ACARS is not easy, as pointed out. This leads me to believe more in an electrical problem or an electrical fire than a manual shutdown. I suggest the pilots probably were not aware ACARS was not transmitting.

As for the reports of altitude fluctuations, given that this was not transponder-generated data but primary radar at maybe 200 miles, the azimuth readings can be affected by a lot of atmospherics and I would not have high confidence in this being totally reliable. But let’s accept for a minute that the pilot may have ascended to 45,000 feet in a last-ditch effort to quell a fire by seeking the lowest level of oxygen. That is an acceptable scenario. At 45,000 feet, it would be tough to keep this aircraft stable, as the flight envelope is very narrow and loss of control in a stall is entirely possible. The aircraft is at the top of its operational ceiling. The reported rapid rates of descent could have been generated by a stall, followed by a recovery at 25,000 feet. The pilot may even have been diving to extinguish flames.

But going to 45,000 feet in a hijack scenario doesn’t make any good sense to me.

Regarding the additional flying time: On departing Kuala Lampur, Flight 370 would have had fuel for Beijing and an alternate destination, probably Shanghai, plus 45 minutes–say, 8 hours. Maybe more. He burned 20-25 percent in the first hour with takeoff and the climb to cruise. So when the turn was made toward Langkawi, he would have had six hours or more hours worth of fuel. This correlates nicely with the Inmarsat data pings being received until fuel exhaustion.

The now known continued flight until time to fuel exhaustion only confirms to me that the crew was incapacitated and the flight continued on deep into the south Indian ocean.

There is no point speculating further until more evidence surfaces, but in the meantime it serves no purpose to malign pilots who well may have been in a struggle to save this aircraft from a fire or other serious mechanical issue. Capt. Zaharie Ahmad Shah was a hero struggling with an impossible situation trying to get that plane to Langkawi. There is no doubt in my mind. That’s the reason for the turn and direct route. A hijacking would not have made that deliberate left turn with a direct heading for Langkawi. It probably would have weaved around a bit until the hijackers decided where they were taking it.

Surprisingly, none of the reporters, officials, or other pilots interviewed have looked at this from the pilot’s viewpoint: If something went wrong, where would he go? Thanks to Google Earth I spotted Langkawi in about 30 seconds, zoomed in and saw how long the runway was and I just instinctively knew this pilot knew this airport. He had probably flown there many times.

Fire in an aircraft demands one thing: Get the machine on the ground as soon as possible. There are two well-remembered experiences in my memory. The AirCanada DC9 which landed, I believe, in Columbus, Ohio in the 1980s. That pilot delayed descent and bypassed several airports. He didn’t instinctively know the closest airports. He got it on the ground eventually, but lost 30-odd souls. The 1998 crash of Swissair DC-10 off Nova Scotia was another example of heroic pilots. They were 15 minutes out of Halifax but the fire overcame them and they had to ditch in the ocean. They simply ran out of time. That fire incidentally started when the aircraft was about an hour out of Kennedy. Guess what? The transponders and communications were shut off as they pulled the busses.

Get on Google Earth and type in Pulau Langkawi and then look at it in relation to the radar track heading. Two plus two equals four. For me, that is the simple explanation why it turned and headed in that direction. Smart pilot. He just didn’t have the time.

为方便大伙阅读，翻译如下：

克里斯·古德费洛拥有20年经验的加拿大类1仪表级飞行员多引擎飞机。

已经有很多猜测马来西亚航空公司航班370 。恐怖主义，劫机，流星。我不能相信在CNN的分析，它几乎是令人不安的。我倾向于寻找一个简单的解释，我觉得它与13,000英尺的跑道在浮罗交怡岛。

我们知道MH370的故事：一个装波音777起飞，半夜从吉隆坡设有，前往北京。一个炎热的夜晚。一个沉重的飞机。大约一个小时出来，向着对面越南的鸿沟，飞机变暗，这意味着转发器和二次雷达跟踪熄灭。两天后，我们听到报道说，马来西亚军用雷达（这是一个主要的雷达，这意味着该飞机是由反射而不是转发审问响应跟踪）跟踪了平面上沿西南方向前进了跨越马来半岛到马六甲海峡。

左转是这里的关键。 Zaharie艾哈迈德Shah1是一个非常有经验的高级船长18000小时的飞行时间。我们老飞行员钻了知道什么是安全港的最近的机场，而在巡航。机场在我们身后，机场正横我们，和机场等着我们。他们总是在我们的头上。始终。如果发生什么事，你不想在想什么，你打算怎么办，你已经知道你要干什么。当我看到左转有直接的标题，我本能地知道他正在驶往机场。他服用可直达帕劳兰卡威，一个13,000英尺的飞机跑道与方法过水，无障碍物。船长没有回头到吉隆坡设有因为他知道他有8,000英尺的山脊跨越。他知道地形是友好的朝浮罗交怡，这也更接近。

一起来看看在这个机场在谷歌地球。飞行员做了所有正确的事情。他面临着一些重大的事件板上，使他做出立即转弯到最近的，最安全的机场。

当我听到这个，我马上提出了谷歌地球，并在靠近朝西南赛道搜索机场。

对我来说，转发器和通信的损失是非常合情合理的火灾。而最有可能的是电气火灾。在发生火灾的情况下，第一个反应就是拉主总线和恢复电路，一个接一个，直到你已经分离出了坏的。如果他们拉到总线，飞机会去无声。它可能是一个严重的事件和机组人员被占领与控制飞机，并试图灭火。 Aviate ，导航，最后，沟通就是在这种情况下的口头禅。

有两种类型的火灾。电气火灾可能不会像速度与激情，并有可能会或可能不会被致残的烟雾。但是存在这样的可能性，给出的时间表，即有对前起落架轮胎之一的过热，它吹上起飞，并开始慢慢地燃烧。是的，这种情况与充气不足的轮胎。请记住：重型飞机，炎热的夜晚，海平面，长远起飞。有在DC8尼日利亚一个众所周知的事故有一个起落架起火起飞。一旦去，一胎火会产生可怕的，致残的烟雾。是的，飞行员可以使用氧气面罩，但是这是一个没有没有用火。最有机会获得一个排烟罩有一个过滤器，但是这将只持续了几分钟取决于烟雾水平。（我用携带一个在我的飞行包，我还是随身携带一个在我的公文包，当我飞。）

我觉得情况是飞行机组是吸入浓烟不适，飞机继续在标题，大概在乔治（自动驾驶仪），直到燃料用尽或火灾烧毁了控制面和它坠毁。你会发现它沿着这条路线，寻找其他地方是没有意义的。

劫机和/或谋杀，自杀和正在进行的炒作有，直到我出现犯规的证据，飞行工程师在船上并没有动摇我赞成犯规的。

我们知道有一个最后的语音传输的，从飞行员的角度来看，是完全正常的。 “晚安”是习惯上的越区切换到一个新的空中交通管制。在“晚安”，也有力地表明，我认为一切都在飞行甲板确定。请记住，有很多方法的试点可以沟通困扰。劫持代码，甚至转发代码关闭一个数字会提醒空管的东西是错误的。每一个优秀的飞行员都知道密钥的SOS在麦克风始终是一个选项。即使是三短的点击会发出警报。所以，我的结论是在语音传输的所有点被认为是很好的飞行甲板上的飞行员。

但事情可能一直在脚麻，不明就里的飞行员的过程。

显然， ACARS去失效一段时间。禁用ACARS是不容易的，正如。这使我更相信的电气故障或电气火灾比手动关机。我建议飞行员可能不知道的ACARS没有发射。

至于高度波动的报告，考虑到这是不是转发器生成的数据，但主要的雷达也许200英里，方位角读数会受到很多大气干扰的，我不会有很高的信心，这是完全可靠的。但是让我们接受飞行员可能已经在最后的努力寻求氧气的最低水平，以平息火灾上升到45000英尺分钟。这是一个可以接受的方案。 45000英尺，这将是很难保持这种飞机稳定，因为飞行包线很窄，并控制在一个摊位损失是完全有可能的。这架飞机是在其经营的天花板上方。本来可以通过摆摊产生的下降迅速报告率，其次是恢复在25000呎。飞行员甚至可能一直潜水灭火。

但去到45000英尺劫持场景没有任何好了意义。

至于额外的飞行时间：在离开吉隆坡设有，飞行370将不得不燃料北京和备用目标，可能上海，增加45分 - 说， 8小时。也许更多。他在接受起飞和爬升到巡航的第一个小时烧20％-25％。因此，当反过来朝着浮罗交怡，他早就有六个小时以上的时间价值的燃料。这很好地关联与接收到的国际海事卫星组织的数据坪，直到燃料耗尽。

在目前已知继续飞行，直到时间耗尽燃料只证实对我说剧组在无行为能力和飞行继续深入到南印度洋。

是毫无意义的进一步猜测，直到更多的证据表面，但同时也是没有用处的中伤飞行员谁也可能是在斗争中拯救这架飞机从??发生火灾或其他严重的机械问题。上尉Zaharie艾哈迈德·沙阿是一个英雄一个不可能的情况下试图让那架飞机到兰卡威挣扎。有一个在我心中的疑问。这对之交和直接的途径的原因。劫机不会作出故意左转有直接的标题为浮罗交怡。它很可能会穿插了一下周围，直到劫机者决定他们在那里接受它。

出人意料的是，没有一个记者，官员，或采访其他飞行员都看着这个从飞行员的角度来看：如果出事了，在那里他会去吗？由于谷歌地球我在大约30秒，放大，发现浮罗交怡，看见跑道有多长，我只是本能地知道这个试验就知道这个机场。他可能飞到那里很多次。

火在飞机要求一件事：尽快拿到机器在地面上。有在我的记忆中两个著名记住的经验。该AirCanada DC9降落，我相信，在美国俄亥俄州哥伦布市在20世纪80年代。该试点延迟血统和绕过几个机场。他没有本能地知道最接近的机场。他把它放在地上，最终，却失去了30多灵魂。瑞士航空的DC- 10新斯科舍省关1998年坠毁是飞行员英勇的另一个例子。他们分别是15分钟取出哈利法克斯但火势战胜他们，他们在海洋中沟。他们根本没有时间了。火顺便开始了，当飞机在大约一个小时了肯尼迪。你猜怎么着？该转发器和通信被切断，因为他们拉到总线。

得到谷歌地球和浮罗交怡岛类型，然后看它相对于雷达的轨道标题。二加二等于四。对于我来说，这是简单的解释为什么它转过身来，朝着这个方向努力。聪明的飞行员。他只是没有足够的时间。
C罗发表于 2014-3-19 13:20 http://bbs.51.ca/images/common/back.gif

驾驶员有在机舱里吸烟的习惯，导致线路失火，不知不觉中烧毁了通讯系统，等机长发现火警已无法和地面通信，于是转向最近的机场准备迫降。。。。。。这个假设可以解释一些实事。

但是这个海域加陆地已经广泛搜索过了，一根毛都没有发现。而且，发动机继续发送信号达6小时以上，这两个事实与这种假设矛盾。而且，如果是线路火灾，机长准备迫降，至少乘客中可以有很多人用手机和家人联系，这都没有发生。

所以，这个假设不可能成立。
酒中仙发表于 2014-3-19 16:14 http://bbs.51.ca/images/common/back.gif

老酒，你确信你读过文章了？
打一地名发表于 2014-3-19 16:17 http://bbs.51.ca/images/common/back.gif

Here's What Pilots Think About The New Idea That The Missing Plane Flew For Hours After A Fire Killed The Pilots

It's been a week and a half since Malaysia 370 disappeared, and the theory du jour comes from a former pilot.
In , himself a pilot: “His explanation makes better sense than anything else I've heard so far ... It's one of the few that make me think, Yes, I could see things happening that way.”

Other pilots aren't convinced, though. In an interview with Business Insider, Michael G. Fortune, a retired pilot who now works as an aviation consultant and expert witness, said pilots preparing to change destination "would have communicated their emergency and intentions to turn around, as well as ask for assistance and direct routing to a suitable airport from the air traffic controllers very quickly."
Goodfellow also wrote: "in the case of fire the first response to pull all the main busses and restore circuits one by one until you have isolated the bad one."
Fortune, who flew 777-200ERs like the one involved here, said pilots follow a specific procedure when there's smoke or fire in the cabin. He didn't buy into the idea that the transponders would have been turned off in an attempt to deal with the problem. "The checklist I utilized for smoke and fumes in the B-777-200ER does not specifically address the transponder being turned off," he said.
Steve Abdu, a 777 captain for a major carrier, echoed Fortune's point that there's a clear checklist to follow in this kind of situation. And, he pointed out, it's unlikely smoke would have knocked the pilots unconscious or killed them — because they have oxygen masks.
Each pilot has a quick-donning mask, and putting it on is step one on the fire checklist. It covers the full face, even if the pilot wears glasses, and can be put on in about two seconds. "These masks are quite excellent at protecting a pilot from smoke and fumes," Fortune said.
The masks are impressive. Pressing clips on the face part inflates the harness; letting go deflates it. You can see how an example works in this Airbus instructional video:
和者盖寡A 发表于 2014-3-19 21:13 http://bbs.51.ca/images/common/back.gif